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Abstract. We present a market-based approach to the Air Traffic Flow
Management (ATFM) problem. The goods in our market are delays and
buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the Federal Avi-
ation Administration (FAA) to buy away the desired amount of delay
on a per flight basis. We give a notion of equilibrium for this market
and an LP whose every optimal solution gives an equilibrium allocation
of flights to landing slots as well as equilibrium prices for the landing
slots. Via a reduction to matching, we show that this equilibrium can be
computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, there
is a special set of equilibrium prices, which can be computed easily, that
is identical to the VCG solution, and therefore the market is incentive
compatible in dominant strategy.
1 Introduction
Air Traffic Flow Management (ATFM) is a challenging operations research prob-
lem whose importance keeps escalating with the growth of the airline industry. In
the presence of inclement weather, the problem becomes particularly serious and
leads to substantial monetary losses and delays3, Yet, despite massive efforts on
the part of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), airline companies,
and even the academia, the problem remains largely unsolved.
In a nutshell, the reason for this is that any viable solution needs to satisfy
several conflicting requirements, e.g., in addition to ensuring efficiency the solu-
tion also needs to be viewed as “fair” by all parties involved. Indeed, [6] state
that “ ... While this work points at the possibility of dramatically reducing delay
costs to the airline industry vis-a-vis current practice, the vast majority of these
proposals remain unimplemented. The ostensible reason for this is fairness ...
.” It also needs to be computationally efficient – even moderate sized airports
today handle hundreds of flights per day, with the 30 busiest ones handling any-
where from 1000 to 3000 flights per day. The full problem involves scheduling
flight-landings simultaneously for multiple airports over a large period of time,
3 According to [5], the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee estimated that in
2007, the loss to the U.S. economy was $25.7 billion, due to 2.75 million hours of
flight delays. In contrast, the total profit of U.S. airlines in that year was $5 billion.
2taking into consideration inter-airport constraints. Yet, according to [5], cur-
rent research has mostly remained at the level of a single airport because of
computational tractability reasons.
Building on a sequence of recent ideas that were steeped in sound economic
theory, and drawing on ideas from game theory and the theory of algorithms,
we present a solution that has a number of desirable properties. Our solution
for allocating flights to landing slots at a single airport is based on the principle
of a free market, which is known to be fair and a remarkably efficient method
for allocating scarce resources among alternative uses (sometimes stated in the
colorful language of the “invisible hand of the market” [24]). We define a market
in which goods are delays and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money
to the FAA to buy away the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis and
we give a notion of equilibrium for this market. W.r.t. equilibrium prices, the
total cost (price paid and cost of delay) of each agent, i.e., flight, is minimized.
This involves a multi-objective optimization, one for each agent, just like
all market equilibrium problems. Yet, for some markets an equilibrium can be
found by optimizing only one function. As an example, consider the linear case
of Fisher’s market [8] for which an optimal solution to the remarkable Eisenberg-
Gale [14] convex formulation gives equilibrium prices and allocations. For our
market, we give a special LP whose optimal solution gives an equilibrium.
Using results from matching theory, we show how to find equilibrium alloca-
tions and prices in strongly polynomial time. Moreover, using [19] it turns out
that our solution is incentive compatible in dominant strategy, i.e., the players
will not be able to game the final allocation to their advantage by misreporting
their private information.
We note that the ATFM problem involves several issues that are not of a
game-theoretic or algorithmic nature, e.g., the relationship between long term
access rights (slot ownership or leasing) and short term access rights on a given
day of operations, e.g., see [4]. Our intention in this paper is not to address the
myriad of such issues. Instead, we have attempted to identify a mathematically
clean, core problem that is amenable to the powerful tools developed in the
theories stated above, and whose solution could form the core around which a
practical scheme can be built.
Within academia, research on this problem started with the pioneering work
of Odoni [21] and it flourished with the extensive work of Bertsimas et. al. ;
we refer the reader to [5][7] for thorough literature overviews and references to
important papers. These were centralized solutions in which the FAA decides a
schedule that is efficient, e.g., it decides which flights most critically need to be
served first in order to minimize cascading delays in the entire system.
A conceptual breakthrough came with the realization that the airlines them-
selves are the best judge of how to achieve efficiency4, thus moving away from
4 e.g., they know best if a certain flight needs to be served first because it is carrying
CEOs of important companies who have paid a premium in order to reach their
destination on time or if delaying a certain flight by 30 minutes will not have dire
3centralized solutions. This observation led to a solutions based on collaborative
decision making (CDM) which is used in practice [25,3,26].
More recently, a market based approach was proposed by Castelli, Pesenti and
Ranieri [9]. Although their formulation is somewhat complicated, the strength
of their approach lies in that it not only leads to efficiency but at the same time,
it finesses away the sticky issue of fairness – whoever pays gets smaller delays,
much the same way as whoever pays gets to fly comfortably in Business Class!
Paper [9] also gave a tatonnement-based implementation of their market. Each
iteration starts with FAA announcing prices for landing slots. Then, airlines
pick their most preferred slots followed by FAA adjusting prices, to bring parity
between supply and demand, for the next iteration. However, they are unable to
show convergence of this process and instead propose running it a pre-specified
number of times, and in case of failure, resorting to FAA’s usual solution. They
also give an example for which incentive compatibility does not hold.
Our market formulation is quite different and achieves both efficient running
time and incentive compatibility. We believe that the simplicity of our solution
for this important problem, and the fact that it draws on fundamental ideas from
combinatorial optimization and game theory, should be viewed as a strength
rather than a weakness.
1.1 Salient features of our solution
In Section 2 we give details of our basic market model for allocating a set of
flights to landing slots for one airport. This set of flights is picked in such a way
that their actual arrival times lie in a window of a couple of hours; the reason
for the latter will be clarified in Section 4. The goods in our market are delays
and buyers are airline companies; the latter pay money to the FAA to buy away
the desired amount of delay on a per flight basis. Typically flights have a myriad
interdependencies with other flights – because of the use of the same aircraft
for subsequent flights, passengers connecting with other flights, crew connecting
with other flights, etc. The airline companies, and not FAA, are keenly aware of
these and are therefore in a better position to decide which flights to avoid delay
for. The information provided by airline companies for each flight is the dollar
value of delay as perceived by them.
For finding equilibrium allocations and prices in our market, we give a special
LP in which parameters can be set according to the prevailing conditions at the
airport and the delay costs declared by airline companies. We arrived at this LP
as follows. Consider a traffic network in which users selfishly choose paths from
their source to destination. One way of avoiding congestion is to impose tolls on
roads. [11] showed the existence of such tolls for minimizing the total delay for
the very special case of one source and one destination, using Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem. Clearly, their result was highly non-constructive. In a followup
work, [16] gave a remarkable LP whose optimal solution yields such tolls for the
consequences, however delaying it longer would propagate delays through their entire
system and result in a huge loss.
4problem of arbitrary sources and destinations and moreover, this results in a
polynomial time algorithm. Their LP, which was meant for a multi-commodity
flow setting, was the starting point of our work. One essential difference between
the two settings is that whereas they sought a Nash equilibrium, we seek a market
equilibrium; in particular, the latter requires the condition of market clearing.
We observe that the underlying matrix of our LP is totally unimodular and
hence it admits an integral optimal solution. Such a solution yields an equilibrium
schedule for the set of flights under consideration and the dual of this LP yields
equilibrium price for each landing slot. Equilibrium entails that each flight is
scheduled in such a way that the sum of the delay price and landing price is
minimum possible. We further show that an equilibrium can be found via an
algorithm for the minimum weight perfect b-matching problem and hence can
be computed combinatorially in strongly polynomial time. In hindsight, our LP
resembles the b-matching LP, but there are some differences.
Since the b-matching problem reduces to the maximum matching problem,
our market is essentially a matching market. Leonard [19] showed that the set
of equilibrium prices of a matching market with minimum sum corresponds pre-
cisely to VCG payments [20], thereby showing that the market is incentive com-
patible in dominant strategy. Since equilibrium prices form a lattice [13,23,1],
the one minimizing sum has to be simultaneously minimum for all goods. For
our market, we give a simple, linear-time procedure that converts arbitrary equi-
librium prices to ones that are simultaneously minimum for all slots. Incentive
compatibility with these prices follows. An issue worth mentioning is that the
total revenue, or the total cost, of VCG-based incentive compatible mechanisms
has been studied extensively, mostly with negative results [2,18,15,12,17]. In con-
trast, since the prices in our natural market model happened to be VCG prices,
we have no overhead for making our mechanism incentive compatible.
The next question is how to address the scheduling of landing slots over longer
periods at multiple airports, taking into consideration inter-airport constraints.
Airlines can and do anticipate future congestion and delay issues and take these
into consideration to make complex decisions. However, sometimes unexpected
events happening even at a few places are likely to have profound cascading
effects at geographically distant airports, making it necessary to make changes
dynamically. For such situations, in Section 4, we propose a dynamic solution
by decomposing this entire problem into many small problems, each of which
will be solved by the method proposed above. The key to this decomposition is
the robustness of our solution for a single set of flights at one airport: we have
not imposed any constraints on delay costs, not even monotonicity. Therefore,
airline companies can utilize this flexibility to encode a wide variety of inter-
airport constraints.
We note that this approach opens up the possibility of making diverse types
of travelers happy through the following mechanism: the additional revenues
generated by FAA via our market gives it the ability to subsidize landing fees
for low budget airlines. As a result, both types of travelers can achieve an end
that is most desirable to them, business travelers and casual/vacation travelers.
5The former, in inclement weather, will not be made to suffer delays that ruin
their important meetings and latter will get to fly for a lower price (and perhaps
sip coffee for an additional hour on the tarmac, in inclement weather, while
thinking about their upcoming vacation).
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work to give a simple LP-
based efficient solution for the ATFM problem. We note that an LP similar
to ours is also given in [1]. This paper considers two-sided matching markets
with payments and non-quasilinear utilities. They show that the lowest priced
competitive equilibria are group strategy proof, which induces VCG payments for
the case of quasilinear utilities. Another related paper is [10], which considers
a Shapley-Shubik assignment model for unit-demand buyers and sellers with
one indivisible item each. Buyers have budget constraint for every item. This
sometimes prevents a competitive equilibrium from existing. They give a strongly
polynomial-time algorithm to check if an equilibrium exists or not, and if it does
exist, then it computes the one with lowest prices. However, they do not ensure
incentive compatibility.
2 The Market Model
In this section we will consider the problem of scheduling landings at one airport
only. Let A be the set of all flights, operated by various airlines, that land in this
airport in a given period of time. We assume that the given period of time is
partitioned into a set of landing time slots, in a manner that is most convenient
for this airport; let S denote this set. Each slot s has a capacity cap(s) ∈ Z+
specifying the number of flights that can land in this time slot. As mentioned
in [4] the arrival of each aircraft consumes approximately the same amount of
airport capacity, therefore justifying the slot capacities as the number of flights
while ignoring their types. We will assume that cap(s) is adjusted according to
the prevailing weather condition.
For i ∈ A, the airline of this flight decides the landing window for flight i,
denoted by W (i). This gives the set of time slots in which this flight should land
as per prevailing conditions, e.g., if there are no delays, the earliest time slot in
W (i) will be the scheduled arrival time5 of flight i. For each slot s ∈ W (i), the
airline also decides its delay cost, denoted by cis ≥ 0. Thus, if time slot s is the
scheduled arrival time of flight i, then cis = 0
6 and in general cis is the dollar
value of the cost, as perceived by the airline, for delay resulting from landing in
slot s.
A landing schedule is an assignment of flights to time slots, respecting ca-
pacity constraints. Each time slot will be assigned a landing price which is the
amount charged by FAA from the airline company if its flight lands in this time
slot. We will define the total cost incurred by a flight to be the sum of the price
paid for landing and the cost of the delay.
5 We will assume that if the flight arrives before this time, it will have to wait on the
tarmac for some time. This appears to be standard practice in case gates are not
available.
6 All the results of this paper hold even if cis 6= 0.
6We say that a given schedule and prices are an equilibrium landing schedule
and prices if:
1. W.r.t. these prices, each flight incurs a minimum total cost.
2. The landing price of any time slot that is not filled to capacity is zero. This
condition is justified by observing that if at equilibrium, a slot with zero
price is not filled to capacity, then clearly its price cannot be made positive.
This is a standard condition in equilibrium economics.
2.1 LP formulation
In this section, we will give an LP that yields an equilibrium schedule; its dual
will yield equilibrium landing prices. Section 3 shows how they can be computed
in strongly polynomial time.
For s ∈ S, xis will be the indicator variable that indicates whether flight i
is scheduled in time slot s; naturally, in the LP formulation, this variable will
be allowed to take fractional values. The LP given below obtains a scheduling
where a flight may be assigned partially to a slot (fractional scheduling), that
minimizes the total dollar value of the delays incurred by all flights, subject
to capacity constraints of the time slots. (Note that the inequality in the first
constraint will be satisfied with equality since the objective is being minimized;
the formulation below was chosen for reasons of convenience).
minimize
∑
i∈A,s∈S cisxis
subject to ∀i ∈ A :
∑
s∈W (i) xis ≥ 1
∀s ∈ S :
∑
i∈A,s∈W (i) xis ≤ cap(s)
∀i ∈ A, s ∈ W (i) : xis ≥ 0
(1)
Let ps denote the dual variable corresponding to the second set of inequalities.
We will interpret ps as the price of landing in time slot s. Thus if flight i lands
in time slot s, the total cost incurred by it is ps + cis. Let ti denote the dual
variable corresponding to the first set of inequalities. In Lemma 1 we will prove
that ti is the total cost incurred by flight i w.r.t. the prices found by the dual;
moreover, each flight incurs minimum total cost.
The dual LP is the following.
maximize
∑
i∈A ti −
∑
s∈S cap(s) · ps
subject to ∀i ∈ A, ∀s ∈W (i) : ti ≤ ps + cis
∀i ∈ A : ti ≥ 0
∀s ∈ S : ps ≥ 0
(2)
Lemma 1. W.r.t. the prices found by the dual LP (2), each flight i incurs min-
imum total cost and it is given by ti.
Proof. Applying complementary slackness conditions to the primal variables we
get
∀i ∈ A, ∀s ∈ W (i) : xis > 0 ⇒ ti = ps + cis.
7Moreover, for time slots s ∈ S which are not used by flight i, i.e., for which
xis = 0, by the dual constraint, the total cost of using this slot can only be
higher than ti. The lemma follows.
The second condition required for equilibrium is satisfied because of comple-
mentarity applied to the variables ps:
If
∑
i∈A,s∈W (i)
xis < cap(s), then ps = 0.
At this point, we can provide an intuitive understanding of how the actual
slot assigned to flight i by LP (1) is influenced by the delay costs declared for
flight i and how LP (2) sets prices of slots. Assume that time slot s is the
scheduled arrival time of flight i, i.e., cis = 0 and s
′ is a later slot. Then by
Lemma 1, slot s will be preferred to slot s′ only if ps − ps′ ≤ cis′ . Thus cis′
places an upper bound on the extra money that can be charged for buying away
the delay incurred by landing in s instead of s′. Clearly, flight i will incur a
smaller delay, at the cost of paying more, if its airline declares large delay costs
for late landing. Furthermore, by standard LP theory, the dual variables, ps,
will adjust according to the demand of each time slot, i.e., a time slot s that is
demanded by a large number of flights that have declared large delay costs will
have a high price. In particular, if a slot is not allocated to capacity, its price
will be zero as shown above.
It is easy to see that the matrix underlying LP (1) is totally unimodular.
Therefore, it has an integral optimal solution. Further, minimization ensures
that for every flight i at most one of the xiss is one and the rest are zero. Hence
we get:
Theorem 1. Solution of LP (1) and its dual (2) give an (optimal) equilibrium
schedule and equilibrium prices.
3 Strongly Polynomial Implementation
As discussed in the previous section, LP (1) has an integral optimal solution
as its underlying matrix is totally unimodular. In this section, we show that
the problem of obtaining such a solution can be reduced to a minimum weight
perfect b-matching problem7, and hence can be found in strongly polynomial
time; see [22] Volume A. The equilibrium prices, i.e., solution of (2), can be
obtained from the dual variables of the matching. Furthermore, we show that
there exist equilibrium prices that induce VCG payments, and hence is incentive
compatible in dominant strategy. Finally, we give a strongly polynomial time
procedure to compute such prices.
Consider the edge-weighted bipartite graph (A′, S, E), with bipartition A′ =
A∪{v}, where A is the set of flights and v is a special vertex, and S is the set of
7 The instance we construct can also be reduced to a minimum weight perfect matching
problem with quadratic increase in number of nodes.
8time slots. The set of edges E and weights are as follows: for i ∈ A, s ∈ W (i),
(i, s) is an edge with weight cis, and for each s ∈ S, there are cap(s) many (v, s)
edges8, each with unit weight (a multi-graph).
The matching requirements are: bi = 1 for each i ∈ A, bs = cap(s) for
each s ∈ S, and bv=
∑
s∈S cap(s) − |A| for v. Clearly, the last quantity is
non-negative, or else LP (1) is infeasible. The following lemmas show that the
equilibrium landing schedule and prices can be computed using minimum weight
perfect b-matching of graph (A′, S, E).
Lemma 2. Let F ∗ ⊂ E be a perfect b-matching in (A′, S, E) and x∗ be a sched-
ule where x∗is = 1 if (i, s) ∈ F
∗. F ∗ is a minimum weight perfect b-matching if
and only if x∗ is an optimal solution of LP (1).
Proof. To the contrary suppose x′ and not x∗ is the optimal solution of LP (1).
Let F ′ = {(i, s) ∈ E | x′is = 1}∪{(cap(s)−
∑
i;s∈W (i) x
′
is) many (v, s) | s ∈ S} be
the set of edges corresponding to schedule x′. Clearly, F ′ is a perfect b-matching.
Note that the matching edges incident on v contribute cost bv in any perfect b-
matching. Since, x′ and not x∗ is an optimal solution of LP (1), we have,
∑
i∈A,s∈W (i)
cisx
′
is + bv <
∑
i∈A,s∈W (i)
cisx
∗
is + bv ⇒
∑
(i,j)∈F ′
cij <
∑
(i,j)∈F∗
cij
Contradicting F ∗ being the minimum weight perfect matching. The reverse im-
plication follows by similar argument in the reverse order.
Using Lemma 2, next we show that the dual variables of the b-matching LP
give an equilibrium price vector. In the b-matching LP there is an equality for
each node to ensure its matching requirement. Let uv, ui and qs be the dual
variables corresponding to the equalities of nodes v, i ∈ A and s ∈ S. Then the
dual LP for minimum weight perfect b-matching in graph (A′, S, E) is as follows.
max :
∑
i∈A
ui +
∑
s∈S
cap(s)qs + uvbv
s.t. ∀i ∈ A, s ∈ W (i) : ui ≤ −qs + cis
∀s ∈ S : uv ≤ −qs + 1
(3)
There are no non-negativity constraints on the dual variables since the cor-
responding primal constraints are equality.
Lemma 3. There exists a dual solution (u∗, q∗) of (3) with u∗v = 1, and given
that, −q∗ yields a solution of LP (2).
Proof. If (u∗, q∗) is a dual solution then so is v = (u∗ + δ, q∗ − δ) for any δ ∈ R.
This is because, clearly v is feasible. Further, since |A| + bv =
∑
s cap(s) the
value of objective function at v is same as that at (u∗, q∗).
8 This is not going to affect strong polynomiality, because we can assume that cap(s) ≤
|A|,∀s without loss of generality.
9Therefore given any solution of the dual, we can obtain one with u∗v = 1 by an
additive scaling. Replacing uv with 1 and qs with −ps in (3) gives max{
∑
i ui−∑
s cap(s)ps + bv | ui ≤ ps + cis, ps ≥ 0}, which is exactly (2), and hence the
lemma follows.
Since a primal and a dual solution of a minimum weight perfect b-matching
can be computed in strongly polynomial time [22], the next theorem follows
using Lemmas 2 and 3, and Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. There is a combinatorial, strongly polynomial algorithm for com-
puting an equilibrium landing schedule and equilibrium prices.
3.1 Incentive Compatible in Dominant Strategy
Since equilibrium price vectors of the market is in one-to-one correspondence
with the solutions of the dual matching LP with uv = 1 (Lemma 3), they need
not be unique, and in fact form a convex set. In this section we show that
one of them induces VCG payments, and therefore is incentive compatible in
dominant strategy. Further, we will design a method to compute such VCG
prices in strongly polynomial time.
An instance of the perfect b-matching problem can be reduced to the perfect
matching problem by duplicating node n, bn times. Therefore, if we convert the
costs cis on edge (i, s) to payoffsH−cis for a big enough constant H , the market
becomes an equivalent matching market (also known as assignment game) [23]
where the costs of producing goods, the slots in our case, are zero. It is not
difficult to check that equilibrium allocations and prices of our original market
and the transformed matching market exactly match.
For such a market, Leonard [19] showed that the set of equilibrium prices
of a matching market with minimum sum correspond precisely to VCG pay-
ments [20], thereby showing that the market is incentive compatible in domi-
nant strategy at such a price vector. Since the proof in [19] is not formal, we
have provided a complete proof in Appendix A. Since equilibrium prices form
a lattice [13,23,1], the one minimizing sum has to be simultaneously minimum
for all goods.9 Clearly, such a price vector has to be unique. Next we give a
procedure to compute the minimum equilibrium price vector, starting from any
equilibrium price vector p∗ and corresponding equilibrium schedule x∗.
The procedure is based on the following observation: Given equilibrium prices
p∗ and corresponding schedule x∗, construct graph G(x∗, p∗) where slots form
the node set. Put a directed edge from slot s to slot s′ if there exists a flight, say
i, scheduled in s at x∗, and it is indifferent between s and s′ in terms of total
cost, i.e. x∗is = 1 and p
∗
s + cis = p
∗
s′ + cis′ . An edge in graph G(x
∗, p∗) indicates
that if the price of slot s′ is decreased then i would prefer s′ over s. Therefore,
in order to maintain x∗ as an equilibrium schedule the price of s also has to be
decreased by the same amount.
9 Equilibrium prices p are minimum if for any other equilibrium prices p′ we have
ps ≤ p
′
s, ∀s ∈ S.
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Lemma 4. Prices p∗m give the minimum equilibrium prices if and only if every
node in G(x∗, p∗m) has a directed path from a zero priced node, where x∗ is the
corresponding equilibrium schedule.
Proof. Suppose slot s does not have a path from a zero priced node. Consider
the set D of nodes which can reach s in G∗ = G(x∗, p∗m); clearly, they have
positive prices. Therefore, ∃ǫ > 0 such that the prices of all the slots in D can
be lowered by ǫ without violating the equilibrium condition (1), contradicting
minimality of p∗m.
For the other direction, the intuition is that if every node is connected to a
zero priced node in G(x∗, p∗m), then price of any slot can not be reduced without
enforcing price of some other slot go negative, in order to get the corresponding
equilibrium schedule. The formal proof is as follows:
To the contrary suppose every node is connected to a zero priced node in G∗
and there are equilibrium prices p′ ≤ p∗m such that for some s ∈ S, p∗ms > p
′
s > 0.
Consider, one such s nearest to a zero-priced node in G∗. Since, p′s ≥ 0, we have
p∗ms > 0, and therefore s is filled to its capacity at prices p
∗m (using equilibrium
condition (2) of Section 2). Let x′ be the equilibrium schedule corresponding to
prices p′.
Let s′ → s in G∗. By choice of s we have that p′s′ = p
∗m
s′ . In that case, a
flight, say i′, allocated to s′ at p∗ will move to s at p′. Implying that
∑
i x
′
is′ <∑
i x
∗
is′ ≤ cap(s
′). Hence p′s′ = 0 ⇒ p
∗m
s′ = 0 (using equilibrium condition (2)).
Let Z = {s | p∗ms = 0}. There are two cases at this point:
Case I - Flights in slot s at x∗ remain in s at x′, i.e., {i |x∗is = 1} ⊆ {i |x
′
is = 1}:
Since, x′i′s = 1 and x
∗
i′s = 0, implying
∑
i x
′
is >
∑
i x
∗
is = cap(s), a contradiction.
Case II - Some flight i scheduled in s at x∗, reschedules at x′, i.e., ∃i, x∗is =
1, x′is = 0:
Construct a graph H , where slots are nodes, and there is an edge from u to v
if ∃i, x∗iu = 1, x
′
iv = 1, i.e., flight i moved from u to v when prices are changed
from p∗m to p′, with weight being number of edges moved. Note that price of
every node with an incoming edge should have decreased while going from p∗m to
p′. Therefore, nodes of Z have no incoming edges. Further, nodes with incoming
edges are filled to capacity at p∗m since their prices are non-zero. In that case,
total out going weight of such a node should be at least total incoming weight
in H .
If there is a cycle in H , then subtract weight of one from all its edges, and
remove zero-weight edges. Repeat this until there are no cycles. Since, s′ ∈ Z,
it had no incoming edge, but had an edge to s. Therefore, there is a path in
remaining H starting at s′. Consider the other end of this path. Clearly, it has
to be filled beyond its capacity at x′, a contradiction.
Using the fact established by Lemma 6 next we design a procedure to compute
the minimum equilibrium prices in Table 1, given any equilibrium prices p∗ and
corresponding schedule x∗.
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Table 1. Procedure for Computing Minimum Optimal Prices
MinimumPrices(x∗, p∗)
1. Z ← Nodes reachable from zero-priced nodes in G(x∗, p∗).
2. Pick a d ∈ S \ Z
3. D ← {Nodes that can reach d in G(x∗, p∗)}, δ ← 0,
and p∗s ← p
∗
s − δ,∀s ∈ D
4. Increase δ until one of the following happen
- If price of a slot in D becomes zero, then go to 1.
- If a new edge appears in G(x∗, p∗), then recompute Z.
If d ∈ Z then go to 2 else go to 3.
5. Output p∗ as the minimum prices.
Lemma 5. Given an equilibrium (x∗, p∗), MinimumPrices(x∗, p∗) outputs min-
imum prices in time O(|A||S|2).
Proof. Note that the size of Z and edges in G(x∗, p∗) are increasing. There-
fore, Step 3 is executed O(|S|) many times in total. Step 4 may need O(|A||S|)
time to compute the threshold δ. Therefore the running time of the procedure
MinimumPrices is O(|A||S|2). Let the output price vector be p∗m. The lemma
follows from the fact that (x∗, p∗m) still satisfy both the equilibrium conditions,
and every slot is reachable from a zero priced node in G(x∗, p∗m) (Lemma 6).
Theorems 1 and 2, Lemma 5, together with [19] give:
Theorem 3. There exists an incentive compatible (in dominant strategy) mar-
ket mechanism for scheduling a set of flight landings at a single airport; moreover,
it is computable combinatorially in strongly polynomial time.
4 Dealing with Multiple Airports
In this section, we suggest how to use the above-stated solution to deal with
unexpected events that result in global, cascading delays. Our proposal is to
decompose the problem of scheduling landing slots over a period of a day at
multiple airports into many small problems, each dealing with a set of flights
whose arrival times lie in a window of a couple of hours – the window being chosen
in such a way that all flights would already be in the air and their actual arrival
times, assuming no further delays, would be known to the airline companies and
to FAA. At this point, an airline company has much crucial information about
all the other flights associated with its current flight due to connections, crew
availability, etc.It is therefore in a good position to determine how much delay it
needs to buy away for its flight and how much it is willing to pay, by setting ciss
accordingly. This information is used by FAA to arrive at a landing schedule.
The process is repeated every couple of hours at each airport.
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A Incentive Compatible in Dominant Strategy
In order to find a socially optimal and fair allocation, it is important that re-
porting true private information be the best strategy for the agents; such a
mechanism is called incentive compatible in dominant strategy. Hence an impor-
tant question for our setting is: Can an airline secure a better deal by reporting
fictitious ciss?
The dual (2) will have a convex set of equilibrium solutions (prices) in general.
Among these, consider solutions that minimize the sum of prices of all slots.
Leonard [19] showed that payment as per these prices, together with the optimal
allocation, are incentive compatible in dominant strategy (DSIC). However the
proof is in discussion form, and not absolutely formal. For convenience, we give
a formal proof in this section.
We will prove that equilibrium price vector with minimum sum is unique and
moreover induces VCG payments. VCG payments together with social-welfare
maximizing allocation induces truthful (DSIC) mechanism [20]. First observe
that such an equilibrium must have a slot with price zero – otherwise subtracting
the minimum price from all slots leads to a better equilibrium. Let x∗ and p∗ be
equilibrium landing schedule and equilibrium prices respectively. The optimality
condition of Lemma 1 can be rewritten as
x∗is = 1 ⇒ p
∗
s + cis ≤ p
∗
is′ + cis′ , ∀s
′ ∈ W (i) (4)
Construct graph G(x∗, p∗) where slots form the node set. Put a directed
edge from slot s to slot s′ with label i if there is a flight i scheduled in s,
and it is indifferent between s and s′ in terms of total cost, i.e. x∗is = 1 and
p∗s + cis = p
∗
s′ + cis′ . An edge in graph G(x
∗, p∗) indicates that if the price of slot
s′ is decreased then i would prefer s′ over s and hence violating condition (4).
Lemma 6. Let p∗ be equilibrium price minimizing
∑
s∈S ps. Then every node
in G(x∗, p∗) has a directed path from a zero priced node.
Proof. Suppose slot s does not have a path from a zero priced node. Consider
the set D of nodes which can reach s in G(x∗, p∗); clearly, they have positive
prices. Therefore, ∃ǫ > 0 such that the prices of all the slots in D can be lowered
by ǫ without violating the optimality condition (4), contradicting minimality of
p∗.
Lemma 7. There is a unique equilibrium price vector that minimizes
∑
s ps.
Proof. Suppose p and p′ both are equilibrium price vectors minimizing
∑
s ps.
Then ∃s ∈ S such that p′s < ps. Consider the path P in G(x
∗, p) from a zero
price node, s0, to s. Next consider prices p
′. In order to satisfy condition 4 for
all the pairs of slots represented by edges on this path, the price of each node
on this path has to be reduced by ps − p
′
s, thereby assigning a negative price to
s0, contradicting the existence of p
′.
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Henceforth let p∗ denote the equilibrium prices that minimize
∑
s∈S ps. Using
the paths established in Lemma 6, next we give explicit expression for values of
p∗s for all slots s. Let the cost of a landing schedule x be defined as cost(x) =∑
i∈A,s∈W (i) xiscis. Now consider a path P (s, s
′) from s to s′ in G(x∗, p∗). Let
x(P (s, s′)) be a landing schedule same as x∗ except that for each edge on path
P (s, s′) the corresponding indifferent flight shifts to the slot the edge is going
into. Note that x(P (s, s′)) may not be feasible in LP (1). In particular it may
violate capacity constraint of slot s′.
Lemma 8. Let P (s0, s) be a directed path from s0 to s in G(x∗, p∗), p∗
s0
= 0,
and x′ = x(P (s0, s)), then p∗s = cost(x
∗)− cost(x′).
Proof. Let the path P (s0, s) be s0
1
−−→ s1
2
−−→ . . .
k−1
−−→ sk−1
k
−−→ sk = s,
where the labels above the arrows are indices of indifferent flights. Since i is the
indifferent flight in slot si−1, we have p∗
si
= p∗
si−1
+ (cisi−1 − cisi), 1 < i ≤ k.
Putting all these together we get p∗s = p
∗
s0 +
∑k
i=1(cisi−1 − cisi). Since x
′ is
obtained from x∗ by shifting flight i from slot si−1 to si, we can rewrite this
expression as p∗s = p
∗
s0 +
∑
i∈A,s∈S cis(x
∗
is − x
′
is) = p
∗
s0 + cost(x
∗) − cost(x′).
Since p∗s0 = 0, this proves the lemma.
Lemma 9. Let xvcg be a VCG landing schedule, then xvcg is a solution of LP
(1).
Proof. Since cis is the “delay cost” incurred by flight i if scheduled in slot s,
−cis is the corresponding “welfare”. Therefore, social welfare maximizing feasible
schedule has to minimize the overall delay costs of all the flights subject to the
capacity constraints of the slots. This is exactly same as solving LP (1).
In order to calculate VCG payment for flight i we need to find an optimal
landing schedule when flight i is not present. This can be obtained by solving
LP (1) with flight set A−i = A \ i. Let x
i be a solution of this LP.
For a schedule x and flight setA′ ⊆ A, define cost(x,A′) as
∑
i∈A′,s∈W (i) xiscis.
The overall minimum delay cost of agents in A−i is cost(x
∗, A−i) when i partic-
ipates and it is cost(xi, A−i) when i does not participate. Therefore, the VCG
payment of flight i, say V CGpayi, is cost(x
∗, A−i)−cost(x
i, A−i). Since the allo-
cation x∗A−i is feasible and x
i is optimal, we get cost(x∗, A−i) ≥ cost(x
i, A−i)⇒
V CGpayi ≥ 0.
Define Hi to be a graph with slots as nodes, and there is an edge from s to
s′ if for a flight j, landing slot shifts from s in x∗ to s′ in xi.
Lemma 10. Let si be the slot assigned to flight i as per x∗. Then graph Hi is
a directed path with si being the sink.
Proof. If there is no incoming edge to si then there are no edges in Hi or else x∗
can not be the optimal allocation for set A. This is because the shifting indicated
by edges of Hi is also possible without removing flight i, which together reduces
overall delay cost as cost(xi, A−i) ≤ cost(x
∗, A−i). By a similar argument it
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follows that Hi can not have any directed cycles. Therefore, Hi is a directed
acyclic graph, with at least one incoming edge to si.
Next we decompose the graph into two components, sayD and F , where D is
a directed path to si from a source, and F is the rest ofHi. Note that once flight i
is removed, the shifting indicated by D and F can be carried out separately while
maintaining the capacity constraints of the slots. Therefore, both individually
should improve the delay cost. However, shifting of F is possible even without
removing flight i, contradicting x∗ being optimal allocation for set A. Therefore,
Hi consists of only the path D.
Using the structure of graphs Hi and G(x∗, p∗), next we prove that VCG
payments are same as the prices p∗ assigned by our market mechanism.
Lemma 11. For every flight i ∈ A, if x∗is′ = 1 then V CGpayi = p
∗
s′ .
Proof. Let P (s0, s′) be a path from s0 to s′ in G(x∗, p∗) with p∗
s0
= 0, and let
x′ = x(P (s0, s′)). Let x′′ = x′A−i . Vector x
′′ is feasible in LP (1) with flight set
A−i. Since x
i is the optimal solution of this LP, we have
cost(xi, A−i) ≤ cost(x
′′, A−i)
⇒ cost(x∗, A−i)− cost(x
i, A−i) ≥ cost(x
∗, A−i)− cost(x
′′, A−i)
⇒ V CGpayi ≥ cost(x
∗, A)− cost(x′, A)
(∵ ∀s, x′is = x
∗
is, and x
′
A−i
= x′′)
⇒ V CGpayi ≥ p
∗
s′ (Lemma 8)
Next we show that p∗s′ ≥ V CGpayi. Suppose the path H
i is y0 → y1 →
· · · → yk−1 → yk, where yk = s′ (Lemma 10), and flight fj shifts from slot
yj−1 in x∗ to slot yj in xi. Since, x∗ and (t∗, p∗) are solutions of LP (1) and (2)
respectively, using Lemma 1 we have
p∗yj + cfjyj ≥ p
∗
yj−1 + cfjyj−1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ k
Putting all of them together and canceling the intermediate price variables
we have
p∗s′ = p
∗
yk
≥ p∗y0 +
∑k
j=1(cfjyj−1 − cfjyj )
= p∗
y0
+
∑
j∈A−i,s∈W (j)
cis(x
∗
js − x
i
js)
The last equality is due to the fact that x∗ and xi are same except for flights
fj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k and flight i. This gives p
∗
s′ ≥ p
∗
y0 + cost(x
∗, A−i)− cost(x
i, A−i).
Since, all the prices are non-negative, we get p∗s′ ≥ V CGpayi.
Lemmas 9 and 11 together gives the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let x∗ be the equilibrium schedule and p∗ be the equilibrium prices
where
∑
s∈S ps is minimum. The mechanism which schedules flight i to slot s if
x∗is = 1 and charges p
∗
s is incentive compatible in dominant strategy.
